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APPORTIONMENT OF DAMGES FOR CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE: A 
FIXED OR DISCRETIONARY APPROACH? 
James Goudkamp* 
In most of the common law world, legislation provides for damages 
to be apportioned where the claimant is guilty of contributory 
negligence. This legislation imposes a system of what will be called 
‘discretionary apportionment’. It gives judges considerable latitude to 
determine the extent to which damages should be diminished for 
contributory negligence. This article draws attention to the fact that 
many, varied departures from this system of discretionary 
apportionment have infiltrated the law. This article classifies these 
departures (which will be called ‘fixed apportionment rules’), 
emphasises that they conflict with the apportionment legislation and 
considers how the conflicts ought to be resolved. An important 
conclusion reached is that the landmark decision in Froom v Butcher 
was decided per incuriam. This is because it laid down fixed 
apportionment rules, and such rules conflict with the apportionment 
legislation. Attention is then turned to the arguments for and against a 
discretionary system of apportionment and a system that incorporates 
more fixed apportionment rules. It contends that much stands to be 
gained from introducing more fixed apportionment rules.  
1. Introduction
The defence of contributory negligence is one of the most important parts of the law of torts.1 
Few other rules are in issue in tort litigation with such regularity. It is undoubtedly the queen 
of the defences known to tort law in terms of its practical impact. For one reason or another, 
however, it has attracted little scholarly interest, and certainly much less than it deserves. 
Given this lack of academic attention, it is perhaps unsurprising that some striking features of 
the law that governs the defence have gone essentially unnoticed. This article begins by 
noting two such features. The first feature is that the rules that control the defence have in 
many jurisdictions remained essentially frozen following the passage of apportionment 
legislation. In Britain, the relevant law has hardly changed at all since the Law Reform 
(Contributory Negligence) Act 1945 was enacted.2 Parliament has scarcely touched this Act 
* Fellow, Keble College, Oxford; Associate Professor, Oxford Law Faculty. I am grateful to John Murphy,
Donal Nolan and Prince Saprai for their helpful comments on early drafts of this article. I am also indebted
to participants in the University of Sydney Forum on Apportionment and the Attribution of Liability
(especially to Peter Cane), the Moral Values and Private Law III workshop at King’s College London
(particularly to Andrew Dyson, John Goldberg, Ajay Ratan, Victor Tadros and Benjamin Zipursky) and the
tort strand of the Society of Legal Scholars’ Annual Conference 2014 (especially to Jenny Steele and
Stephen Todd). I am grateful to Ellen Bublick for reviewing my use of US sources and also to Eleanor
Mitchell for her research assistance.
1 ‘“Contributory negligence” … is raised very frequently, and has a great impact on the operation of the law’: 
Tony Weir, An Introduction to Tort Law (2nd ed, 2006) 123; ‘Contributory negligence is a core element in 
tort law in England (and other common law countries)’: WVH Rogers, ‘Contributory Negligence under 
English Law’ in U Magnus and M Martín-Casals (eds), Unification of Tort Law: Contributory Negligence 
(2004) 57, 57. 
2  Most of the Act extends to Scotland. It does not extend to Northern Ireland, which has its own legislation: 
Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act (Northern Ireland) 1948. 
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since passing it,3 and the courts have made relatively few (and certainly no radical) changes 
to the law in this area. Generally speaking, the description of the law regarding contributory 
negligence offered by Glanville Williams in 1951 in his magisterial treatise Joint Torts and 
Contributory Negligence4 is as accurate today as when it was written.5 The law in Canada has 
similarly remained largely stationary since the introduction of apportionment legislation, 
which occurred in most of Canada during the 1920s and 1930s. The situation in Australia has 
been more fluid. Several Australian legislatures have enacted statutes that, among other 
things, erect presumptions of contributory negligence where the claimant engages in specified 
behaviour6 and compel the courts to reduce damages by a minimum7 or fixed percentage8 in 
certain situations. However, these changes to the defence of contributory negligence in 
Australia are hardly revolutionary. In summary, since the coming of apportionment, the law 
governing the defence of contributory negligence has generally been extremely stable 
throughout the common-law world.  
 The second striking feature of the law regarding the defence of contributory negligence 
that has passed largely unnoticed is that inter-jurisdictional differences in the law between 
common law systems are minimal. For example, the core rules that govern the defence in 
Australia, Britain and Canada are essentially identical. These rules, stated very simply, are as 
follows: (1) a claimant is guilty of contributory negligence if he fails to take reasonable care 
of his own safety and that failure is causally related to his damage;9 (2) if the claimant is 
guilty of contributory negligence, his action will not be defeated on account of that 
contributory negligence, but his damages must be reduced;10 and (3) the reduction must be 
‘just and equitable’ and this is determined by having regard to the relative blameworthiness 
of the parties and the causal potency of their acts.11 The situation in the United States disrupts 
this harmonious picture. Some jurisdictions in the United States embrace ‘pure comparative 
responsibility’ regimes, which consist of rules that are materially identical to those that have 
just been described. However, a majority of jurisdictions have ‘modified comparative 
responsibility’ systems, in which contributory negligence by the claimant is fatal to his action 
3  Tweaks were made to the Act by the National Insurance (Industries Injuries) Act 1946, the Carriage by Air 
Act 1961, the Fatal Accidents Act 1976, the Civil Liability (Contribution) Act 1978, the Consumer 
Protection Act 1987 and the Environmental Protection Act 1990.  
4  Glanville L Williams, Joints Torts and Contributory Negligence: A Study of Concurrent Fault in Great 
Britain, Ireland and the Common-Law Dominions (London, Stevens & Sons, 1951). 
5  ‘Glanville Williams[’s] ... text on contributory negligence ... remains, arguably, the best analysis available 
today’ of the law in this area: Chae v Min [2001] ABQB 1071, [14]; ‘Although now over 50 years old, 
G. Williams, Joint Torts and Contributory Negligence (1950) is still the leading treatment’: Rogers (n 1) 57, 
fn 1. 
6  See, e.g., Motor Accidents Compensation Act 1999 (NSW), s 138(2); Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), 
s 50(3).  
7  See the text accompanying nn 72–76. 
8  See the text accompanying nn 65–66, 71. 
9  ‘In order to establish the defence of contributory negligence, the defendant must prove, first, that the plaintiff 
failed to take “ordinary care for himself,” or, in other words, such care as a reasonable man would take for 
his own safety, and secondly, that his failure to take care was a contributory cause of the accident”: Lewis v 
Denye [1939] 1 KB 540 (CA) 554 (Du Parcq LJ).  
10  If the plaintiff is guilty of contributory negligence, the courts have no discretion not to reduce damages: 
Boothman v British Northrop Ltd [1972] 13 KIR 112 (CA) 121–122; Bagder v Ministry of Defence [2005] 
EWHC 2941 (QB); [2006] 3 All ER 173, [15]. 
11  Stapley v Gypsum Mines Ltd [1953] AC 663 (HL) 682; Podredersek v Australian Iron and Steel Pty Ltd 
(1985) 59 ALJR 492 (HCA) 494. The position in Canada might be different in this connection. Consider 
Cempel v Harrison Hot Springs Hotel Ltd (1997) 43 BCLR (3d) 219, [19] where it is opined that the parties’ 
fault only should be compared. See also Heller v Martens [2002] ABCA 122; (2002) 4 Alta LR (4th) 51. 
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if his share of the responsibility for his damage reaches a certain level (usually 51%).12 
Accordingly, rule (2), above, is not fully implemented in the United States. However, 
notwithstanding the diversity of approaches in the United States, it is generally true to say 
that, in most of the common-law world, there is a high degree of uniformity in the law 
regarding contributory negligence.  
 These two features of the law governing the defence of contributory negligence – minimal 
evolution in the law subsequent to the introduction of apportionment legislation and a high 
degree of uniformity among common law jurisdictions – might be thought to suggest that 
there is widespread satisfaction with law in this connection. This perception is arguably 
reinforced by the fact that, in most of the common-law world, academic engagement with the 
defence is virtually non-existent. This is particularly true in Australia, Canada and the United 
Kingdom, where descriptions of the defence offered by textbooks writers are uniformly bland 
and prosaic13 and the defence is usually mentioned only in passing in academic journals.14 
Difficult questions are simply not being asked in relation to it. This article tackles one such 
question: to what extent should the apportionment of damages for contributory negligence be 
left to judicial discretion? In other words, should judges have essentially free rein to 
determine the appropriate discount or should what will be called ‘fixed apportionment’ rules 
which stipulate the discount to be applied ex-ante be adopted? This question appears not to 
have been previously considered, at least not directly. Certainly, no mention of it is made of it 
by Glanville Williams in his work on contributory negligence,15 which remains the most 
comprehensive treatment of the subject by far.  
 This article unfolds as follows. Section 2 explains what the concepts of discretionary 
apportionment and fixed apportionment entail. In Section 3, it is noted that the British 
apportionment provision (which has served as a model in many other jurisdictions), embraces 
discretionary apportionment. Section 4 notes that, despite the acceptance of discretionary 
apportionment, many fixed apportionment rules have infiltrated the law in all of the major 
common law jurisdictions. Section 5 stresses the incompatibility of discretionary 
apportionment rules and fixed apportionment rules and Section 6 discusses how conflicts 
between such rules should be resolved. Section 7 examines the case for and against 
discretionary and fixed apportionment and concludes that it would be better if the law was 
tilted more in favour of fixed apportionment than it is at present. Section 8 considers how, 
precisely, the law should be shifted more in the direction of fixed apportionment. Section 9 
addresses some possible objections to the recommendations made in Section 8. Section 10 
addresses some implications of the analysis in relation to the law concerning contribution. 
The main conclusions are summarised in Section 11.  
 
2. The Concepts Distinguished  
 
In a legal system that provides for damages to be apportioned for contributory negligence, a 
distinction can be drawn between two general approaches to apportioning damages based on 
how free judges are to determine the appropriate discount in damages. These approaches to 
apportionment will be called ‘discretionary apportionment’ and ‘fixed apportionment’. Under 
                                                          
12  Regarding the jurisdictions that accept pure and modified comparative responsibility, and the small number 
of jurisdictions that withhold apportionment altogether, see Restatement (Third) Torts: Apportionment of 
Liability §7 cmt a.  
13  In 1974 one writer justifiably complained that ‘In England most standard textbooks have little or nothing to 
say’ about contributory negligence: JC Hicks, ‘Seat Belts and Crash Helmets’ (1974) 37 MLR 308, 313. 
This complaint remains valid today.  
14  For rare exceptions see Glanville Williams, ‘The Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act 1945’ (1946) 9 
MLR 105; Nigel Gravells, ‘Three Heads of Contributory Negligence’ (1977) 93 LQR 581.  
15  Williams (n 4).  
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discretionary apportionment, judges enjoy essentially absolute freedom to decide the discount 
in view of the salient features of the case before them. They can have regard to whatever facts 
that they feel are important. In a system of discretionary apportionment, a given act of 
contributory negligence might attract a particular discount in one case and a rather different 
discount in another. This possibility exists because, as has been noted, trial judges have 
essentially free rein to determine the amount by which the damages should be discounted in 
the light of the circumstances of the case. Different judges will naturally reach different 
conclusions concerning the size of the discount that is appropriate.  
By contrast, fixed apportionment entails apportioning damages in some ex-ante way. 
Judicial freedom to determine the discount for contributory negligence is restricted. Under a 
fixed apportionment regime, categories of case are identified and cases that fall within a 
given category are handled in the same fashion, at least to a certain degree. Thus, fixed 
apportionment can result in cases that fall within a given category being handled in a like way 
irrespective of the fact that two cases that fall within the category concerned might be rather 
dissimilar. The most obvious way of isolating a category to which a fixed apportionment rule 
may be applied is by reference to particular acts of contributory negligence, such as failing to 
wear a seat belt or use a safety-helmet.  
The distinction between discretionary apportionment and fixed apportionment should not 
be overstated. The difference between these concepts is not as stark as it may initially seem. 
For one thing, under a system of discretionary apportionment, judges do not have total 
freedom to impose a given discount, hence why it was stated in the first paragraph of this 
section that the freedom enjoyed by judges in a discretionary apportionment regime is only 
essentially absolute. The freedom given to judges in a discretionary apportionment system 
can plainly never be total because judges, by virtue of their office, are subject to certain 
constraints.16 Judges must act judicially, and this includes an obligation to produce outcomes 
that are at least roughly consistent with other cases which factually similar. In other words, 
judges, in a system of discretionary apportionment, cannot ‘indulge fancy or mere whim’.17 
They cannot pluck figures out of the air.  
A second reason why the contrast between discretionary apportionment and fixed 
apportionment is less extreme than it might at first glance appear is that, under a fixed 
apportionment system, judges will still enjoy some discretion. They will, at the very least, 
have discretion to decide whether the instant case is one to which a fixed apportionment rule 
applies. For example, if a statute provides that damages must be reduced by, say, 50%, if the 
claimant was injured while relying on an intoxicated defendant,18 the judge will have some 
leeway to decide what the words ‘relying’ and ‘intoxicated’ mean (unless he is constrained by 
a prior interpretation of those words by a court the decision of which he is bound) and 
whether the words are applicable to the facts of the case given the meanings that he ascribes 
to them.  
A third and final reason why the gulf between discretionary apportionment and fixed 
apportionment is not as vast as one might initially think is because they represent poles on a 
spectrum rather than digital choice. A legislature, for example, might provide for a fixed 
apportionment rule (say, a provision that stipulates that a given act of contributory negligence 
will attract a fixed discount of 25%), but incorporate a safety valve that allows judges to 
                                                          
16  As HLA Hart observed in his ‘lost’ essay on discretion (HLA Hart, ‘Discretion’ (2013) 127 Harvard Law 
Review 652 at 657): ‘When we are considering the use of discretion in the Law we are considering its use by 
officials who are holding a responsible public office. It is therefore understood that if what officials are to do 
is not rigidly determined by specific rules but a choice is left to them, they will choose responsibly having 
regard to their office and not indulge in fancy or mere whim…’. 
17  ibid, 657. 
18  See, e.g., the Australian statutes mentioned in nn 71, 74. 
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depart from the rule if they consider that applying it would produce injustice or if the case is 
exceptional. Such a rule would lie somewhere near the middle of the postulated spectrum. 
The same would be true of a rule that limited the permissible reductions in damages to a 
reduction falling within a particular range, say, between 25% and 75%.  
Despite these three reasons for concluding that the contrast between discretionary 
apportionment and fixed apportionment is not black and white, it plainly remains possible to 
draw at least a rough line between, on the one hand, a system of discretionary apportionment 
and, on the other hand, a system of fixed apportionment. A legal system can be identified, at 
least in a rough and ready way as accepting either discretionary apportionment or fixed 
apportionment. This article proceeds on the basis of this understanding.  
  
3. The Embrace of Discretionary Apportionment  
  
The British apportionment provision is contained in section 1 of the Law Reform 
(Contributory Negligence) Act 1945. This provision, which has been widely replicated 
elsewhere,19 relevantly states that where the claimant is guilty of contributory negligence the 
‘damages recoverable … shall be reduced to such extent as the court thinks just and equitable 
having regard to the claimant’s share in the responsibility for the damage’. This provision 
plainly opts for a system of discretionary apportionment.20 It does not, for example, specify 
ex-ante reductions in damages that are to be applied to certain types of cases. Furthermore, 
the words ‘just and equitable’ give the courts significant leeway to determine the appropriate 
apportionment.21 They afford the judge the opportunity to look at all of the circumstances of 
the case at hand. Consistently with the fact that the provision opts for discretionary 
apportionment, it has often stressed that it requires each case to be decided on its own facts22 
and that appellate courts will rarely disturb a trial judge’s determination as to the appropriate 
reduction in damages.23  
 While the British apportionment provision clearly gives trial judges great freedom, so that 
it can properly be said to opt for a system of discretionary apportionment, it fetters the 
discretion that it affords in at least two ways. First, the discretion must be exercised having 
regard to ‘the claimant’s share in the responsibility for the damage’.24 This excludes certain 
facts from consideration. For example, it would be wrong, given this statutory language, for 
the court to take into account in determining the appropriate discount the fact that the 
claimant risked the defendant’s safety or the safety of third parties. Such facts do not relate to 
the claimant’s responsibility for the damage, which means, of course, the damage suffered by 
                                                          
19  See, e.g., Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1965 (NSW), s 9; Contributory Negligence Act 1947 
(NZ), s 3. 
20  It is a classic example of what Hart called ‘expressed or avowed use of discretion’: Hart (n 16) 655–656.  
21  ‘It is clear that the Act intends to give a very wide discretion to the judge or jury entrusted with the … task 
of making the apportionment. Much latitude must be allowed to the … tribunal in arriving at a judgment as 
to what is just and equitable’: Pennington v Norris (1956) 96 CLR 10, 15–16 (HCA). See also Stanton v 
Collinson [2010] EWCA Civ 81; [2010] RTR 26, [26]. However, in Smith v Chief Constable of 
Nottinghamshire Police [2012] EWCA Civ 161; [2012] RTR 23, [36] the court seemed to doubt whether the 
apportionment legislation affords trial judges an ‘unfettered discretion’.  
22  ‘The significance of the various elements involved in [the determination of the appropriate apportionment] 
will vary from cars to case’: Podrebersek v Australian Iron & Steel Pty Ltd (1885) 59 ALJR 492 (HCA) 494; 
‘[T]he degree of contributory negligence depends on the particular circumstances of the individual case’: 
Finlayson v Lanarkshire Health Board (1996) Rep LR 119 (OH) …; ‘[I]t is important to remember that 
every case depends upon its own facts’: Phethean-Hubble v Coles [2012] EWCA Civ 349; [2012] RTR 31, 
[80]; ‘Each case … must be decided on its own facts’: Currie v Clamp’s Executor 2002 SLT 196 (OH) [22]. 
23  Phethean-Hubble v Coles [2012] EWCA Civ 349, [86]. Even the approximate frequency with which 
appellate courts actually intervene is unknown. No data are available in this connection.  
24  Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act 1945, s 1(1).  
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the claimant.25 As Glanville Williams put it, ‘fault not contributing to the damage cannot be 
taken into account’.26 The fact that the discretion must be exercised having regard to ‘the 
claimant’s share in the responsibility for the damage’ also means that certain things must be 
considered. For example, the court must take into account the defendant’s share in the 
responsibility for the damage since, as Hale LJ noted in Eagle v Chambers, ‘[i]t is … 
impossible to consider the claimant's “share” without also considering that of the 
defendant.’27 
 A second way in which the apportionment legislation limits the discretion that it affords 
judges is on account of the fact that it stipulates that reductions in damages for contributory 
negligence must be ‘just and equitable’. The courts have endeavoured to discover what 
Parliament intended by these words.28 As mentioned earlier,29 it has been held, at least in 
Australia and Britain, that these words require judges to have regard to the parties’ relative 
moral blameworthiness and the ‘causative potency’ of their careless conduct. The fact that 
judges must take account of these considerations into account (and perhaps only these 
considerations30) limits their discretion. Of course, these factors are extremely general and it 
has never been explained in any detail what they mean, so their adoption does little to curtail 
the discretion that judges enjoy in apportioning damages.  
 
4. Fixed Apportionment Rules 
 
The British apportionment provision and the apportionment provisions in other 
Commonwealth jurisdictions give the impression that discretionary apportionment reigns 
supreme. However, the true situation is rather different and significantly more complex. 
Jurisdictions that prima facie accept discretionary apportionment as a consequence of their 
apportionment legislation often recognise rules that provide for fixed apportionment to a 
limited extent. At least three types of fixed apportionment rules can be identified: (1) rules 
that provide for fixed reductions in damages; (2) rules that provide for minimum reductions 
in damages; (3) rules that place a ceiling on permissible reductions in damages. These rules 
will be discussed seriatim. The goal here is, in addition to drawing attention to their 
existence, to determine their scope. These are not the only types of fixed apportionment rules 
that could exist. There are at least two further types of fixed apportionment rules that could 
be created: (4) rules that establish a floor on permissible reductions in damages; and (5) rules 
that limit the permissible discount to a particular range of discounts. Although no clear 
example of such rules can be found in any Commonwealth jurisdiction, a few words will also 
be said about these additional types of fixed apportionment rules.  
                                                          
25  This is clear from the opening words of s 1(1): ‘Where any person suffers damage as the result partly of his 
own fault and partly of the fault of any other person or persons, a claim in respect of that damage…’. 
26  Williams (n 4) 390.  
27  [2003] EWCA Civ 1107; [2004] RTR 9, [14]. 
28  See further the text accompanying n 100. 
29  See the sources cited in n 11. 
30  The issue of whether or not these factors are exhaustive of the consideration to which the courts are 





(a) Fixed Reductions in Damages 
 
(i)  The Froom Rules 
 
A leading decision regarding the defence of contributory negligence is Froom v Butcher.31 
This was a run-of-the-mill seat belt case. The claimant passenger suffered more serious 
injuries in an accident that was caused by the defendant driver’s negligence than he would 
have suffered had he used a seat belt.32 The trial judge held that the failure to wear a seat belt 
did not constitute contributory negligence.33 Lord Denning MR (with whom Lawton and 
Scarman LJJ agreed) reversed this holding. In the course of doing so, his Lordship laid down 
several rules to determine how damages should be apportioned where the claimant 
negligently failed to wear a seat belt.34 He wrote:35  
 
 Sometimes the evidence will show that the failure [to wear a seat belt] made no difference. The 
damage would have been the same, even if a seat belt had been worn. In such case the damages 
should not be reduced at all. At other times the evidence will show that the failure made all the 
difference. The damage would have been prevented altogether if a seat belt had been worn. In such 
cases I would suggest that the damages should be reduced by 25 per cent. But often enough the 
evidence will only show that the failure made a considerable difference. Some injuries to the head, 
for instance, would have been a good deal less severe if a seat belt had been worn, but there would 
still have been some injury to the head. In such case I would suggest that the damages attributable 
to the failure to wear a seat belt should be reduced by 15 per cent. 
 
An often overlooked fact about Froom is that Lord Denning MR did not adhere strictly to 
these rules (the Froom rules’) in disposing of the appeal. Since the evidence was that some of 
the claimant’s injuries would have been completely avoided had the claimant used a seat belt 
while other injuries would have been incurred regardless of whether the claimant had worn a 
seat belt,36 Lord Denning MR decided to reduce the damages by 20%. 20% was the figure by 
which the trial judge said he would have reduced damages had he found the claimant guilty 
of contributory negligence. Possibly also important in Lord Denning MR’s decision to 
impose a discount of 20% was the fact that the claimant did not suggest that this discount was 
inappropriate.  
Lord Denning MR did not change the law in remarking that damages should not be 
apportioned if the claimant’s negligent failure to wear a seat belt would not have made any 
difference to the damage. Causally irrelevant contributory negligence by the claimant has 
never been sufficient to enliven the defence of contributory negligence.37 Such contributory 
                                                          
31  [1976] QB 286 (CA). A perceptive note on Froom is JR Spencer, ‘Belt Up!––The Widening Scope of 
Contributory Negligence’ [1976] Cambridge Law Journal 44. 
32  The plaintiff suffered injuries to his head, chest and one of his fingers. The head and chest injuries would 
have been avoided if the plaintiff had worn a seat belt. The plaintiff’s finger would have been injured 
regardless of whether he had used a seat belt: Froom v Butcher [1976] QB 286 (CA) 296. 
33  Froom v Butcher [1974] 1 WLR 1297 (QBD).  
34  Lord Denning MR also established several rules concerning the circumstances in a plaintiff should be found 
guilty of contributory negligence. For instance, his Lordship also laid down the principle that the plaintiff 
can be guilty of contributory negligence provided that his carelessness contributes merely to the damage as 
opposed to the accident: at 292–293. These other rules created by Lord Denning MR are not presently 
relevant and nothing further will be said about them. 
35  [1976] QB 286 (CA) 296.  
36  See n 32.  
37  In Caswell v Powell Duffryn Associate Collieries Ltd [1940] AC 152 (HL) 165 Lord Atkin said ‘[i]f the 
plaintiff were negligent but his negligence was not a cause operating to produce the damage there would be 
8 
 
has always been immaterial, both before and after the enactment of the apportionment 
legislation. However, the situation is otherwise with respect to Lord Denning MR’s 
suggestion that damages should be reduced by 25% reduction if the damage suffered would 
have been completely avoided had the claimant worn a seat belt, and by 15% if the damage 
would have been less severe. By these remarks, Lord Denning MR isolated two categories of 
case and suggested that cases falling into those categories should be subject to fixed 
discounts. In other words, he created fixed reduction rules.  
What is the status of the Froom rules? It is arguable that they are merely obiter dicta given 
that Lord Denning MR did not apply them. One might also fairly contend that 
Lord Denning MR meant only for them to be guidelines (he spoke in permissive language38). 
However, this is not how they have been understood by the courts. Judges seem to adhere 
strictly to them (although no one has carried out the empirical work that is necessary to 
confirm whether this is so). The rules do not, of course, determine the outcome of cases 
where a negligent failure to use a seat belt is combined with another act of contributory 
negligence (as will often be the case), such a accepting a lift from an intoxicated driver,39 
travelling in a car knowing that its brakes were defective,40 or travelling in the boot of a car.41 
In such cases, discounts greater than those enunciated in Froom are often applied. However, 
where the only act of contributory negligence is a negligent failure to wear a seat belt it 
seems that the courts rarely depart from the Froom rules. They have been applied countless 
times42 and attempts to modify them have repeatedly been rebuffed.43 The courts have made 
it crystal clear that they have little or no appetite for reconsidering them.44 Indeed, the courts 
have extended them to related contexts, such as a failure of motorcyclists45 and bicyclists46 to 
wear crash helmets.47  
Of course, despite the foregoing, is difficult to be certain regarding the extent to which the 
Froom rules are determinative in practice. This is partly because most of the cases to which 
they will have been relevant will have been decided by courts that are situated lower in the 
judicial hierarchy than the High Court, and decisions of such courts are rarely reported or 
otherwise made publically available. It is also because litigants are also free to reach an 
agreement on the issue of apportionment. Litigants are obviously not forced to accept the 
Froom rules. There is some evidence that litigants, oddly, sometimes agree to discounts that 
differ wildly from those established in Froom even though Froom would clearly apply were 
the case litigated.48  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
no defence. I find it impossible to divorce any theory of contributory negligence from the concept of 
causation.’ 
38  See the text accompanying n 35. 
39  See, e.g., Sloan v Triplett 1985 SLT 294 (OH) (33.3%); Hill v Chivers 1987 SLT 323 (OH) (33.3%).  
40  See, e.g., Gregory v Kelly [1978] RTR 426 (QBD) (40%).  
41  See, e.g., Gleeson v Court [2007] EWHC 2397 (QB); [2008] RTR 10 (30%). 
42  See, e.g., Patience v Andrew [1983] RTR 447 (QBD); Palmer v Kitley [2008] EWHC 2819 (QB); 
Mabiriizi v HSBC Insurance (UK) Ltd [2011] EWHC 12080 (QB), [10]. 
43  See, e.g., the unsuccessful attempts made in Gawler v Raettig [2007] EWHC 373 (QB), [39]–[46]; Stanton v 
Collinson [2010] EWCA Civ 81; [2010] RTR 284, [26].  
44  This message is made particularly clear in Stanton v Collinson [2010] EWCA Civ 81, [27].  
45  Capps v Miller [1989] 2 All ER 333; [1989] 1 WLR 839 (CA).  
46  Smith v Finch [2009] EWHC 53 (QB).  
47  For discussion, see Julian Fulbrook, ‘Cycle Helmets and Contributory Negligence’ [2004] Journal of 
Personal Injury Law 171. The rules were not extended to riding in the boot of a car: Gleeson v Court [2007] 
EWHC 2397 (QB); [2008] RTR 10, [25] (30%).  
48  See, e.g., Madden v Quirk [1989] 1 WLR 702 (QBD) (5%); Hitchens v Berkshire Council (unreported, Court 
of Appeal of England and Wales, 21 June 2000) (50%); Demetriou v Holdsowrth (unreported, High Court of 
England and Wales, 11 May, 2001, WL 949928) (10%).  
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It is true that the Froom rules are not wholly inflexible (recall that they were not applied in 
Froom itself49). Judges have a discretion to depart from them. However, the courts have said 
firmly and repeatedly that they will be departed from only in ‘rare or exceptional’50 cases. It 
has been declared that it ‘is of the greatest importance that they should be generally be kept 
to’51 and that they are not ‘mere suggestion or guidance’.52 Only a handful of cases can be 
found in which they were not applied where they were prima facie applicable.53 Where the 
defendant contends that the discount for contributory negligence should be increased above 
25% it seems that only conscious risk taking by the claimant will render a case sufficiently 
exceptional to escape from the grip of the Froom rules.54 It seems that there is no reported 
case or case the decision in which is electronically available in which this condition has been 
satisfied.55  
The Froom rules have not been swallowed hook, line and sinker by the courts in any other 
jurisdiction.56 However, they are not infrequently referred to by courts in Australia57 and 
Canada58 and are plainly influential in those countries. Nevertheless, in both of these 
jurisdictions it seems that judges have greater discretion to impose the discount that they 
think is warranted. For example, in Snushall v Fulsang Juriansz JA wrote: ‘Canadian courts 
generally … have not expressed approval of the three-level framework Lord Denning 
suggested.’59 In Heller v Martens, Fruman JA observed: ‘It is obvious that in English seat 
belt cases apportionment is based on a fixed qualification that is considerably less 
discretionary than a typical Alberta analysis.’60  
 
(ii) Other Fixed Reduction Rules 
 
No other fixed reduction rules appear to have been developed by the courts in any 
jurisdiction. Tugendhat J recently claimed in Best v Smyth that ‘since Owens v Brimmell 
[1977] QB 859 the figure of 20% is commonly regarded as an appropriate reduction for a 
claimant who has got into a vehicle when he must have known that the driver had had too 
much to drink.’61 Although it is true that cases in which the claimant accepted a ride from a 
drunken defendant can be found in which a 20% reduction was applied,62 it is doubtful that 
                                                          
49  See the text accompanying n 36.  
50  Gawler v Raettig [2007] EWHC 373 (QB), [26]. See also Jones v Wilkins [2001] RTR 19 (CA) [18]. 
51  Capps v Miller [1989] 2 All ER 333 (CA) 341; [1989] 1 WLR 839, 849–850 (Croom-Johnson LJ). 
52  Gawler v Raettig [2007] EWHC 373 (QB), [25]; contra Chae v Min [2001] ABQB 1071, [25] 
(‘[Lord Denning MR] proposed a mere guideline’) (Veit J). 
53  See, e.g., Roberts v Sparks [1977] CLY 2643 (20%); Capps v Miller [1989] 2 All ER 333; [1989] 1 WLR 
839 (CA) (10%); Hazlett v Robinson [2014} NIQB 17 (20%). 
54  Jones v Wilkins [2001] RTR 19 (CA) [19]; Gawler v Raettig [2007] EWHC 373 (QB), [31]. 
55  In Jones v Wilkins [2001] RTR 19 (CA) [15] Keene LJ remarked that ‘there has been no reported case of 
which counsel are aware where a passenger’s failure to wear a seat belt has resulted in a finding of more than 
25 per cent contributory negligence.’ 
56  Including Scotland: see, e.g., Smith v Donald McLaren Ltd 1977 SLT (Notes) 51 (OH) (20%); Sloan v 
Triplett 1985 SLT 294 (OH) 297 (20%). 
57  See, e.g., Hallowell v The Nominal Defendant (Queensland) [1983] 2 Qd R 266, 268 (Full Ct); Ferrett v 
Worsley (1993) 61 SASR 234 (Full Ct) 242; Richard v Mills [2003] WASCA 97, [26]. 
58  ‘Froom v Butcher … has been widely accepted and approved in Canada and has acquired a settled place in 
our jurisprudence’: Fowler v Schneider National Carries Ltd [2001] NSCA 55; (2001) 193 NSR (2d) 206, 
[52]; ‘Many Canadian courts have relied on Lord Denning’s 1975 decision in Froom v Butcher’: Chae v Min 
[2001] ABQB 1071, [24]; ‘Lord Denning’s judgment in Froom has been cited consistently in Canadian 
cases’: Snushall v Fulsang (2005) 258 DLR (4th) 425 (CA) [36]. 
59  (2005) 258 DLR (4th) 425 (CA) [36]. 
60  [2002] ABCA 122; (2002) 4 Alta LR (4th) 51, [38].  
61  [2010] EWHC 1541 (QB), [12]. 
62  See, e.g., …. 
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any such fixed reduction rule exists. The judge in Owens, Watkins J, did nothing to indicate 
that he was doing anything other than making a decision solely for the purpose of the 
proceedings before him. (Certainly, he did not offer remarks analogous to those made by 
Lord Denning MR in Froom.) Some judges have denied that Owens sets the figure of 20% in 
stone.63 A welter of relevant cases can be found in which a different discount was applied.64  
 Statutory fixed reduction rules exist in some jurisdictions. For example, in the Northern 
Territory,65 South Australia,66 New Brunswick67 and Newfoundland68 legislation provides 
that damages must be reduced by 25%69 for failing to wear a seat belt.70 In South Australia, if 
the claimant is guilty of contributory negligence because he relied on an intoxicated 
defendant, statute stipulates that damages must be cut back by 25%. This discount is 
increased to 50% if the defendant was intoxicated to a sufficient degree.71 None of these 
statutory fixed reduction rules gives the court the power not to apply the prescribed discount.  
 
(b) Minimum Reductions in Damages 
 
The second type of fixed apportionment rules that will be addressed are minimum reduction 
rules. Such rules require damages to be reduced by at least a specified percentage (such as 
25%) where the claimant is guilty of contributory negligence. Whereas fixed reduction rules 
result in damages being reduced in all cases that fall within a given category by a set amount 
(and by no more and no less), minimum reductions rules demand that all cases that fall within 
a given category have the award cut back by at least a prescribed figure. Greater reductions in 
damages are permitted. Minimum reduction rules and fixed reduction rules are fundamentally 
different from each other. Fixed reduction rules eliminate completely the discretion of the 
trial judge, save for the discretion that the judge has as to the issue of whether the rule applies 
in the first place. By contrast, minimum reduction rules merely eliminate certain discounts 
from consideration (such as discounts of less than 25%). The judge is left free to reduce the 
claimant’s damages by more than the prescribed minimum. Minimum reductions rules still 
depart, of course, from the notion of discretionary apportionment. This is because, even if, in 
the circumstances of the case, the court would, if it had the choice, apply a discount less than 
the minimum prescribed percentage, the court is compelled to reduce damages by at least that 
percentage.  
Minimum reduction rules have long existed in Australia, although they only became 
widespread at the start of the 21st Century. Today, all of Australia’s minimum reduction rules 
are all concerned with intoxication cases.72 They provide that damages must be reduced by at 
                                                          
63  Stinton v Stinton [1993] PIQR P135 (QBD) 140; Currie v Clamp’s Executor 2002 SLT 196 (OH) [22]. 
64  See, e.g., Meah v McCreamer [1985] 1 All ER 367 (QBD) (25%); Stinton v Stinton [1993] PIQR P135 
(QBD) (33.3%); Donelan v Donelan [1993] PIQR P205 (QBD) (75%) (however, it was said that ‘the fact of 
this case [were] wholly exceptional’ (at 210)); Currie v Clamp’s Executor 2002 SLT 196 (OH) [22] (33.3%). 
65  Motor Accidents (Compensation) Act (NT), s 11(1).  
66  Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA), s 49(3).  
67  Insurance Act, RSNB 1973, c I-12, s 265.2(1).  
68  Automobile Insurance Act, FSNL 1990, c A-22, s 28.1.  
69  There is a fixed reduction of 15% for failing to wear a seat belt in Tasmania: Motor Accidents (Liabilities 
and Compensation) Act 1973 (Tas), s 22(4).  
70  The Northern Territory and South Australian legislation extends to a failure to wear a safety helmet. The 
legislation in South Australia applies also if the claimant travelled in a compartment of a vehicle other than a 
passenger compartment. 
71  Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA), s 47(3) and (6).  
72  The only exception is s 22 of the Motor Accidents (Liabilities and Compensation) Act 1973 (Tas), which 
provides for a minimum reduction of 15% for failing to wear a seat belt.  
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least 25% where the claimant is intoxicated73 or where he negligently ‘relied’ on an 
intoxicated defendant.74 In some States, this minimum discount is increased to 50% where the 
claimant’s contributory negligence is thought to be aggravated, such as where the claimant 
was a driver,75 or where the person on whom the claimant relied was a driver.76 Minimum 
reduction rules also exist in Canada. Legislation in New Brunswick,77 Newfoundland78 and 
Nova Scotia79 provides that where the claimant fails to wear a seat belt and contributes to his 
damage by some additional act of contributory negligence his damages shall be reduced by 
not less than 25%.  
 
(c)  Ceilings on Reductions in Damages 
 
A maximum permitted reduction in damages is a ceiling on the size of the discount that a 
court can apply for contributory negligence (for example, 25%). Ceilings are the inverse of 
rules that provide for minimum reductions in damages. They depart from the concept of 
discretionary apportionment because they restrict the discount for contributory negligence to 
a given level even if the court would, but for the limit, have assigned a greater share of 
responsibility for the damage to the claimant. It is arguable that there is a judicially created 
ceiling in seat belt cases in at least some Canadian Provinces. In Snushall v Fulsang 
Juriansz JA, speaking for the Ontario Court of Appeal, opined that a discount greater than 
25% in seat belt cases would be ‘unreasonable’.80 In a striking departure from the ‘never say 
never’ ethos that is generally embraced by judges, his Honour wrote:81 ‘In my view, there is 
no reason to leave open the possibility that a greater apportionment might be appropriate in a 
rare case.’82 In Vigoren v Nystuen Richards JA, with whom the other members of the Court of 
Appeal of Saskatchewan agreed, said ‘the 25% figure should apply as a firm cap’.83 
 Legislatures in several jurisdictions in the United States have capped the maximum 
discount in seat belt cases. For example, in Michigan, a court cannot reduce damages by more 
than 5% in such cases.84 What about jurisdictions that embrace modified comparative 
responsibility? As explained earlier,85 under modified comparative responsibility, as soon as 
the discount reaches a particular threshold (usually 51%), the claimant’s action will fail 
completely. Are such schemes illustrations of fixed apportionment rules? Such systems are 
probably better understood as not involving fixed apportionment rules. Rather, under 
modified comparative responsibility, apportionment is simply not available once the 
claimant’s share of responsibility for the damage becomes sufficient large. Instead of 
damages being apportioned, the claim is denied in toto for contributory negligence.  
                                                          
73  Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), s 50; Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld), s 47; Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA), 
s 46.  
74  Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld), s 48(4); Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA), s 47(5). 
75  Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) s 47(5); Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA), s 46(4). 
76  Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld), ss 48–49; Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA), s 47.  
77  Insurance Act, RSNB 1973, c I-12, s 265.2(2). 
78  Automobile Insurance Act, RSNL 1990, c A-22, s 28.1(2). 
79  Automobile Insurance Contract Mandatory Conditions Regulations, NS Reg 181/2003, s 10(1). 
80  Snushall v Fulsang (2005) 258 DLR (4th) 425 (CA) [44]. 
81  ‘Never say never’ is often an appropriate catchphrase for a judge to have in mind’: Al Rawi v Security 
Service [2010] EWCA Civ 482, [69]. 
82  Snushall v Fulsang (2005) 258 DLR (4th) 425 (CA) [44]. 
83  [2006] SKCA 47, [102].  
84  MCL 257.710e(6). A 5% ceiling applies also in Iowa (Iowa Code Ann, § 321.445(4)), Nebraska (Neb Rev 
Stat, § 60–6,273) and Oregon (Or Rev Stat Ann, § 31.760). In Missouri, the ceiling is 1% (Mo Ann Stat, 
§ 307.178(4)) while in Wisconsin it is 15% (Wisconsin Stat, § 347.48(2m)(g)).  
85  See the text accompanying n 12. 
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  In Britain, despite some earlier doubts, it seems that the courts cannot reduce damages by 
100% on account of the claimant’s contributory negligence.86 It might be thought that the rule 
that damages can only be reduced for contributory negligence by less than 100% is a ceiling 
(although the precise height of the ceiling is unclear (is it, for example, 95%, or 99%?)). The 
better view, however, is that the reason why damages cannot be reduced by 100% is not 
because there is a ceiling on the maximum discount but because the defence of contributory 
negligence will not be engaged in the first place where a court would, if the rule applied, by 
minded to reduce damages by 100%. A court that concludes that a 100% discount is 
warranted is stating that the claimant is solely responsible for the damage about which the he 
complains. But if the claimant is solely responsible for his damage, no tort will have been 
committed, and if no tort is committed the question of contributory negligence will not even 
arise for consideration.87 It follows that the principle that 100% discounts are not permitted is 
not in fact a ceiling on the size of permissible discount, but a rule about the circumstances in 
which the defence of contributory negligence applies.  
 
(d) Floor on Reductions in Damages 
 
A floor on the permissible reduction in damages for contributory negligence would be a fixed 
apportionment rule. An example of such a rule would be a rule that stipulated that damages 
cannot be reduced by less than 5% for a given act of contributory negligence. Such a rule 
would restrict in a modest way the discretion available to the courts to reduce damages. It 
does not seem that there are any floors in Commonwealth jurisdictions. Reductions of less 
than 10% are unusual, but not unheard of.88 However, because a floor is a type of fixed 
apportionment rule it is mentioned for completeness.  
 
(e)  Range of Permissible Discounts in Damages 
 
A fifth type of fixed apportionment rule is a rule that restricts the courts to a discount that 
falls between two percentages. For example, a legislature might enact a provision that states 
that a given act of contributory negligence can attract discounts between 40% and 60% only. 
Such a rule (which combines a ceiling with a floor) would obviously limit the courts’ 
discretion to determine the appropriate discount. Do rules that confine the courts to discounts 
within a particular range exist any common law jurisdictions? Arguably, Canada recognises 
such a rule in seat belt cases. In Galaske v O’Donnell Cory J remarked: ‘The courts in this 
country have consistently deducted from 5 to 25 percent from claims for damages for 
personal injury on the grounds that the victims were contributorily negligent for not wearing 
seat belts.’89 It is not clear, however, whether there is any formal rule that restricts the courts’ 
discretion in this regard, or whether Cory J was merely observing that most discounts in seat 
belt cases tend to fall within this range.  
                                                          
86  Reeves v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [2000] 1 AC 360 (HL) 372, 387; Anderson v Newham 
College of Further Education [2002] EWCA Civ 505; [2003] ICR 212; Buyukardicli v Hammerson UK 
Properties plc [2002] EWCA Civ 683, [7].  
87  ‘[O]ne does not get to the question of contributory negligence until liability is established’: Sharpe v 
Addison [2003] EWCA Civ 1189, [2007] Lloyd’s Rep PN 12, [32]. 
88  Consider Pasternack v Poulton [1973] 1 WLR 476 (QBD) 483 (5%); Pring v Hooper (unreported, NSWSC, 
McInerney J, 10 March 1993) (1%); Snushall v Fulsang (2006) 258 DLR (4th) 425 (Ont CA) (5%); Nominal 
Defendant v Rooskov [2012] NSWCA 43; (2012) 60 MVR 350 (5%). In Stapley v Gypsum Mines Ltd [1953] 
AC 663 (HL) 677 Lord Porter said that had he found the defendant liable, he would have attributed to the 
defendant an ‘infinitesimal’ percentage of responsibility for the loss. It is not clear whether by this 
Lord Porter would have discounted damages at all even if he had concluded that the defendant was liable.  




(f)  Summary 
 
Although the apportionment provisions in all of the major common law jurisdictions adopt 
discretionary apportionment, fixed apportionment rules have crept into the law in these 
jurisdictions as a result of both judicial and statutory invention (although the Froom rules are 
the only illustration of a judicially created fixed apportionment rule). At least three different 
types of fixed apportionment rules exist: (1) rules that provide for fixed reductions in 
damages (e.g., reduction by exactly 25%), (2) rules that require the courts to reduce damages 
by a minimum amount (e.g. reduction of at least 25%), and (3) rules that place a ceiling on 
the maximum discount (e.g., reduction of not more than 25%). Theoretically, additional types 
of fixed apportionment rules could be created including (4) floors on the permissible 
reductions in damages (e.g., reduction not less than 25%), and (5) provisions that restrict 
discounts to a particular range (e.g., reduction greater than 25% and less than 50%). Some 
fixed apportionment rules restrict the judge’s discretion to a much greater degree than others. 
By far the most restrictive type of fixed apportionment rule is a fixed reduction in damages. 
The only discretion that these rules leave to the trial judge is the discretion to decide whether 
the fixed reduction rule applies in the first place.  
 
5. The Conflict between Discretionary Apportionment and Fixed Apportionment 
  
Discretionary apportionment and fixed apportionment are incompatible approaches to 
apportionment. Discretionary apportionment leaves the judge essentially free to determine the 
discount that he thinks is appropriate given the unique circumstances of each case. By 
contrast, fixed apportionment fixes the discount in some predetermined way. It is important 
to note that, although the two approaches to apportionment may result in the same discount in 
a given case, they can lead to different outcomes. Suppose that a claimant passenger is 
injured in a car accident due to the negligence of the driver of the vehicle in whose car he was 
travelling. The claimant was not wearing a seat belt. Had the claimant used a seat belt, he 
would have escaped injury. In Britain, the claimant’s damages will, pursuant to Froom, be 
reduced by 25%, unless the case is considered to be exceptional.90 Now consider the same 
scenario with the following modifications made to it. Suppose that the driver of the vehicle in 
which the claimant was travelling was intoxicated (in circumstances where the claimant did 
not know and could not reasonably have discovered this fact). Suppose also that the driver is 
an adult whereas the passenger is a teenager. In the modified scenario, most people would 
think, it is suggested, that the driver carries a significantly greater proportion of responsibility 
for the claimant’s damage than in the original scenario. Yet, by virtue of Froom, damages 
will still be reduced by 25% unless, again, the case is considered to be exceptional. Recall 
that British courts are extremely reluctant to conclude that a case is exceptional.91 
Conversely, were the issue of apportionment determined by a discretionary apportionment 
rule, the damages would be discounted by a greater percentage in the original scenario than in 
the modified scenario.  
  
6. Resolving the Conflict 
 
It has been explained that the apportionment provisions in at least all of the major common 
law jurisdictions are committed to discretionary apportionment.92 It has also been shown that 
                                                          
90  See the text above accompanying nn 50–53. 
91  See the text accompanying nn 50–53. 
92  See above Section 3.  
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many fixed apportionment rules exist.93 All of the fixed apportionment rules are statutory in 
nature, save for the Froom rules. Finally, it has been demonstrated that discretionary 
apportionment and fixed apportionment are incompatible approaches to apportioning 
damages.94 They can, as has been explained, yield different outcomes. We are dealing, 
therefore, with a situation of inconsistent laws. How should this conflict be resolved? For 
reasons that will be given in a moment, this question needs to be approached differently 
depending on whether a given fixed apportionment rule is statute-based or developed by the 
courts.  
 
(a) Statutory Fixed Apportionment Rules 
 
Where a statute provides for a fixed apportionment rule, it is clear that the fixed 
apportionment rule concerned must prevail over the discretionary apportionment rule laid 
down by the apportionment legislation. This is for the simple reason that they will invariably 
be more specific than the rule in the apportionment legislation: generalia specialibus non 
derogant. Fixed apportionment rules are confined to particular contexts, such as motor 
vehicle accidents or to particular acts of contributory negligence, such as being intoxicated. 
Conversely, the apportionment provisions are, of course, extremely general. Although they 
do not apply to proceedings for all torts,95 they do in principle apply to all factual situations 
that might be presented by actions to which they extend. For example, in the context of the 
action in negligence, the apportionment provisions apply to all conceivable types of negligent 
and contributorily negligent behaviour. Unsurprisingly, when judges have considered 
statutory fixed reduction rules they invariably simply apply them without even mentioning 
the fact that they collide with the apportionment legislation.96  
 
(b) Common Law Fixed Apportionment Rules 
 
The Froom rules are the only well-established judge-made fixed apportionment rules. 
Because these rules fetter the discretion that the apportionment legislation gives to judges, it 
is strongly arguably Froom (and many decisions that apply the Froom rules97) was decided 
per incuriam.98 This, admittedly, is a radical suggestion. However, this conclusion follows 
inexorably from the fact that fixed apportionment rules are inconsistent with the discretionary 
approach to apportionment laid down by the apportionment legislation. It might be replied 
that Froom is compatible with the apportionment legislation on the ground that 
                                                          
93  See above Section 4.  
94  See above Section 5.  
95  In Britain, for example, the apportionment legislation does not apply to proceedings in trespass to the person 
(Co-Operative Group (CWS) Ltd v Pritchard [2011] EWCA Civ 329; [2011] 3 WLR 1272), trespass to 
goods or conversion (Torts (Interference with Goods) Act 1977, s 11(1) or deceit (Standard Chartered Bank 
v Pakistan National Shipping Corp (Nos 2 and 4) [2002] UKHL 43; [2003] 1 AC 959). 
96  See, e.g., Robbins v Skouboudis [2013] QSC 101, [52]; Hawira v Connolly [2008] QSC 4, [53]. 
97  See above Section 4(a)(i).  
98  John Spencer seemed to hint at this in a note in Froom. Referring to ‘the way in which the Court of Appeal 
tried to prescribed in advance the percentage by which a plaintiff’s damage should be reduced’, Spencer 
wrote ‘As the apportionment of damages for contributory negligence is usually treated as a matter for the 
discretion of the court in question, it is possible to raise academic objections to this’: Spencer (n 31) 45. 
Robert Stevens is explicit. He contends that the fixed reduction rules laid down in Froom ‘flagrantly ignor[e] 
the statutory language’: R Stevens, ‘Should Contributory Fault be Analogue or Digital?’ in A Dyson, 
J Goudkamp and F Wilmot-Smith (eds), Defences in Tort (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2014) (forthcoming). 
Cf Stanton v Collinson [2010] EWCA Civ 81; [2010] RTR 26, [26] where Hughes LJ, speaking for the 
Court of Appeal, contended that the fact that the apportionment legislation gives great discretion to judges 
‘permits an approach such as adopted in Froom v Butcher.’  
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Lord Denning MR in that case was merely endeavouring to interpret the words ‘just and 
equitable’ in the apportionment legislation.99 His Lordship was not, on this way of looking at 
things, creating new rules that clashed with that legislation. So understood, Lord Denning 
MR did not exceed his judicial function but, rather, simply sought to discern what Parliament 
meant by the words ‘just and equitable’. To put this counterpoint in the factual context in 
Froom, the Froom rules do nothing more than explain what a ‘just and equitable’ reduction in 
damages is in seat belt cases.  
 It is difficult, however, to characterise plausibly what Lord Denning MR did in Froom was 
an exercise in statutory interpretation. Compare, in this regard, the cases that tell us that it is 
relevant to consider the relative blameworthiness of the parties and the causal potency of their 
acts in asking what a ‘just and equitable’ allocation of responsibility is.100 It can plausibly be 
argued that the identification of these twin factors as relevant to the determination of the 
amount by which damages ought to be reduced for contributory negligence where no fixed 
apportionment rule applies are simply attempts to interpret the words ‘just and equitable’, and 
that the identification of these factors as relevant to apportionment is not an instance of 
judicial legislation. The laying down of the Froom rules is a fundamentally different exercise 
from the identification of these twin factors. Consider what Lord Denning MR said in Froom 
in an attempt to justify his decision to lay down the 15% and 25% fixed reduction rules in 
that case. His Lordship wrote:  ‘Suffice it to assess a share of responsibility which will be just 
and equitable in the great majority of cases.’101 These words are revealing since they 
recognise that there will be some cases in which the reduction in damages yielded by the 
Froom rules will not be just and equitable. In this passage Lord Denning MR essentially 
acknowledged, therefore, that the rules that he established were incompatible with the 
legislation. The correct conclusion, therefore, is indeed that Froom was decided per incuriam.  
 
7. Advantages and Disadvantages 
 
Nothing that has been said so far addresses directly the respective merits and demerits of 
fixed apportionment. It is to this issue that attention will now be turned. What are their 
advantages and disadvantages?102  
 
(a) The Case for Discretionary Apportionment 
 
A case in favour of discretionary apportionment was made in what has become known as the 
Ipp Report,103 which is an important Australian report that advised the governments of 
Australia how the tort system should be changed so as to address a perceived ‘insurance 
crisis’.104 The authors of this report said:105  
                                                          
99  I am grateful to Andrew Burrows for suggesting this counterargument to me.  
100  See the text accompanying nn 11, 28–30. 
101  [1976] QB 286 (CA) 296. 
102  I have derived much assistance in formulating the analysis in this section from discussions of the use of 
discretion in sentencing in the criminal law and in the law of evidence. I have found particularly insightful 
the treatments in Colin Tapper, ‘The Law of Evidence and the Rule of Law’ (2009) CLJ 67 and Andrew 
Ashworth, Sentencing and Criminal Justice, 4th ed (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2005) 30–31, 
41–42, 51–54, 72–74. 
103  Commonwealth of Australia, Review of the Law of Negligence: Final Report (2002). 
104  Peter Cane was one of the authors of the Ipp Report. For his thoughts on the report, see Peter Cane, 
‘Reforming Tort Law in Australia: A Personal Perspective’ (2003) 27 Melbourne University Law Review 
649. The report is also discussed in James Goudkamp, ‘The Young Report: An Australian Perspective on the 
Latest Response to Britain’s “Compensation Culture”’ (2012) 28 Journal of Professional Negligence 4. The 
Australian legislatures were unpersuaded by the Panel’s recommendations in this connection, and enacted 




[C]ontributory negligence come[s] in an infinite variety of forms. From one case to another, the 
respective culpability of the plaintiff and defendant, and their relative causal contributions to 
the death or injury may differ widely. It is impossible to fix a minimum, just and equitable 
apportionment of responsibility to the plaintiff applicable to cases where the plaintiff’s 
contributory negligence involves a certain type of behaviour. In the opinion of the Panel, any 
such reduction would be arbitrary and unprincipled, and could work injustice in some cases. 
The Panel considers that any fettering of judicial discretion to apportion damages for 
contributory negligence is undesirable. 
 
Two arguments in favour of discretionary apportionment are ravelled together in this passage, 
and it is important to separate them. The first argument is that discretionary apportionment 
rules are superior to fixed apportionment rules because the latter rules are arbitrary while the 
former are more principled. The authors of the Ipp Report were obviously correct to note that 
the size of discounts mandated by fixed apportionment rules are arbitrarily determined. A rule 
that requires, for example, damages to be reduced by 25% for a given act of contributory 
negligence is no more and no less defensible than a rule that imposes a discount of half or 
double that amount.106 But discretionary apportionment rules are vulnerable to precisely the 
same criticism. Apportionments yielded by a system of discretionary apportionment are no 
less arbitrary than those produced by a fixed apportionment rule. Degrees of contributory 
negligence simply cannot be measured in the same way that, for example, distance, weight or 
height can be measured. It has often been pointed out that the decision to select a particular 
discount instead of another discount is an arbitrary one. For example, Dean Prosser wrote: 
‘Obviously any estimate that 40 per cent of the total fault rests with the pedestrian who walks 
out into the street in the path of an automobile, and 60 per cent with the driver who is not 
looking and runs him down, represents nothing resembling accuracy based on demonstrable 
fact.’107 Similarly, Richard Epstein observed: ‘there is nothing about the particular pattern of 
factual information, even if perfectly known, that demands any unique set of percentages in 
any given case. All allocation of responsibility between the two parties is arbitrary…’.108 The 
first argument offered by the authors of the Ipp Report in favour of discretionary 
apportionment is, for these reasons, unconvincing.  
 The second argument, at which the authors of the Ipp Report only hint, is based on the fact 
that the number of combinations of factual circumstances that can be relevant to the 
determination of the respective shares of responsibility are infinite and infinitely various. If a 
fixed apportionment rule is laid down, there is a danger that dissimilar cases will be treated in 
the same way, and that similar cases will be handled differently. For example, if a statute 
provides that damages must always be reduced by 25% whenever the claimant is guilty of 
contributory negligence on account of his intoxication, the same discount might be applied to 
both voluntarily and involuntarily intoxicated claimants, to both slightly and grossly 
intoxicated claimants, to both teenage and adult defendants and so on. Similarly, if a statute 
stipulates that such a discount must be applied whenever a claimant motorist is guilty of 
contributory negligence in driving in excess of the speed limit, the same discount will be 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
105  Commonwealth of Australia, Review of the Law of Negligence: Final Report (2002) 126 [8.16]. 
106  As Richards JA observed in Vigoren v Nystuen [2006] SKCA 47, [98]: ‘There is no precise and self-
evidently correct amount by which the plaintiff’s claim should be reduced. Lord Denning [in Froom v 
Butcher] could, no doubt, have chosen a somewhat higher or lower number for his benchmark figure. No one 
would pretend that [the figure of] 25% [which applies where using a seat belt would have prevented all of 
the damage] was the only rational choice available.’ Other judges have made similar remarks. See, e.g., 
Gleeson v Court [2007] EWHC 2397 (QB); [2008] RTR 10, [24].  
107  William L Prosser, ‘Comparative Negligence’ (1953) 41 California Law Review 1, 9.  
108  Richard A Epstein, ‘Plaintiff’s Conduct in Products Liability Actions: Comparative Negligence, Automatic 
Division and Multiple Parties’ (1979) 45 Journal of Air Law and Commerce 87, 109–110.  
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applied irrespective of whether a given claimant was driving 5 mph or 50 mph above that 
limit and regardless of the prevailing driving conditions. Intuition suggests that the variations 
in these two scenarios are morally important and that the law would be unjust were it not 
sensitive to them.  
 
(b) The Case for Fixed Apportionment 
 
What is the case in favour of fixed apportionment rules?  One thing that fixed apportionment 
rules have going in their favour is that they make the outcome of litigation more certain, 
especially if they are rarely departed from, as is the case, for example, with the Froom 
rules.109 Thus, in the United Kingdom, a claimant who is guilty of contributory negligence on 
account of failing to wear a seat belt can usually calculate with a high degree of certainty the 
percentage by which his damages will be discounted on account of contributory negligence. 
All other things being equal, the more predictable the outcome of litigation the more likely it 
is that litigants will settle their dispute.110  
A second advantage of fixed apportionment rules is that they help to keep the cost of 
litigation in proportion to the value of the underlying claim. A rule that, for example, 
stipulates that damage must be reduced by 25% on account of a given act of contributory 
negligence leaves much less room for evidence to be called and for submissions to be made 
in relation to the issue of apportionment than a rule that states, as the apportionment 
legislation does, that damages should be reduced to such extent as is ‘just and equitable’. 
Under the imagined former rule, the only evidence that would be admissible is that which 
casts light on whether the claimant committed the act of contributory negligence that triggers 
the rule. Conversely, under the latter rule, a vastly wider range of evidence would be prima 
facie admissible. Indeed, any evidence that concerns the relative blameworthiness of the 
parties and the causal potency of their acts would be relevant. Lord Denning MR was mindful 
of this factor in Froom. He wrote: ‘Th[e] question [of apportionment] should not be 
prolonged by an expensive inquiry into the degree of blameworthiness on either side, which 
would be hotly disputed.’111 Few would dissent, it is suggested, from the proposition that the 
cost of litigation should be at least roughly proportionate to the value of what is at stake.112 
Quelling disputes at a cost that is proportionate to the value of the case is part of the 
‘overriding objective’ of the Civil Procedure Rules.113 
Thirdly, fixed apportionment rules promote consistency in the way that cases are decided. 
There is a great danger under a system of discretionary apportionment that similar cases will 
be treated differently and that different cases will be handled in a like manner. The danger of 
disparate outcomes is particular acute given that the vast majority of cases in which 
apportionment is in issue are decided in County Courts114 (and in institutionally equivalent 
courts in the case of other jurisdictions). This is because the decisions of those Courts are not 
publically available and so opportunities for judges to refer to each other’s decisions on 
                                                          
109  See Section 4(a)(i).  
110 ‘[T]here is a powerful public interest in there being no [prolonged or intensive enquiry into] fine degrees of 
contributory negligence, so that the vast majority of cases can be settled according to a well-understood 
formula and those few which entail trial do not mushroom out of control’: Stanton v Collinson [2010] 
EWCA Civ 81; [2010] RTR 284, [26]; ‘There is value in having clear guidelines normally applicable, so as 
to aid parties in arriving at sensible settlements.’: Jones v Wilkins [2001] RTR 19 (CA) [18].  
111  ibid, 296.  
112  For discussion in this regard, see AAS Zuckerman, Zuckerman on Civil Procedure (3rd, ed, Sweet & 
Maxwell, London 2013) …. 
113  CPR 1.1(1).  
114  It is clear that most cases in which apportionment for contributory negligence is in issue are personal injury 
cases, and the vast majority of such cases are brought in the County Courts: see ….  
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apportionment which a view to achieving a degree of consistency are extremely limited. The 
difficulty with this situation is compounded by an apparent lack of appellate oversight of 
decisions on apportionment. As mentioned earlier,115 it is a well-established principle that 
appellate scrutiny of decisions regarding apportionment will be made available only rarely. 
Appellate courts will intervene only exceptionally where it is clear that the first-instance 
decision is flawed. The lack of appellate control means that it is virtually certain that there 
will be significant diversity in the way in which the issue of apportionment is decided at first-
instance. Even if such diversity does not exist, the risk that it will develop is substantial.  
Fourthly, and most fundamentally, fixed apportionment rules promote the rule of law. In 
an ideal world, every conceivable situation would be catered for by a rule that is settled ex 
ante. The development of a precise set of rules by which we are to be governed has long been 
recognised as one aspect of the rule of law.116 Of course, because of ignorance about the way 
in which the world works, and the lack of precision in our language, it is impossible to 
comply perfectly with this goal. The use of discretion by judges to deal with disputes the 
resolution of which cannot be provided for justly in advance is, therefore, inevitable. But it is 
very doubtful that the current state of affairs in relation to apportionment for contributory 
negligence is as close to the ideal as can be achieved. Although many fixed apportionment 
rules exist throughout the common law world, relatively few fixed-apportionment rules exist 
within a single jurisdiction. In the United Kingdom, for example, the only fixed 
apportionment rules are those established by Froom. Most jurisdictions are fully under the 
spell of the apportionment provision which, as has been explained, imposes an apportionment 
regime that is about as close to a purely discretionary system as is possible to achieve.117  
 
8. Reform Recommendations 
 
It was argued in the previous section that, while it is necessary to confer judges with some 
discretion in the context of apportionment, the current system goes much too far in the 
direction of discretionary apportionment. More fixed apportionment rules should be 
introduced. Introducing such rules would promote certainty in the law, reduce the cost of 
litigation, tend to ensure consistency in outcomes (in circumstances where there is a great risk 
of inconsistency) and bring this area of law into increased compliance with the rule of law. 
How, precisely, should the law be shifted in the direction of fixed apportionment?  
 
(a)  A Structured Discretion?  
 
One option would be to amend the apportionment legislation so that the discretion that it 
affords to judges is more structured. The legislation in all major common law jurisdictions 
currently permits judges to consider or to exclude from consideration almost any facts or 
factors that they wish.118 The legislation could be changed so that it requires judges to 
consider facts or factors that are thought to be relevant.119 Such facts or factors might include, 
                                                          
115  See the text accompanying n 23.  
116  See the classic discussion in Lon L Fuller, The Morality of Law (revised edition, New Haven, CT, Yale 
University Press, 1969) ch 1. 
117  It might be replied to this rule-of-law argument that the rule of law has only a weak or no grip in private law. 
The rule of law obviously makes the most stringent demands of the criminal law. However, it is mistake to 
think that it made no demands of private law: for discussion see J Gardner, ‘Some Rule-of-Law Anxieties 
about Strict Liability in Private law’ in L Austin and D Klimchuk (eds), The Rules of Law and Private Law 
(Oxford, OUP, 2014) (forthcoming).  
118  See above Section 3.  
119  Such structured discretions are now extremely popular. See, e.g., s 142(1) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003, 
which sets out purposes of sentencing that courts must consider in sentencing defendants.  
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for instance, the respective ages of the parties, the ease with which the parties could have 
avoided or reduced the risk of damage that materialised, the gravity and magnitude of the risk 
that the parties’ respective conduct created or increased, whether the parties were subjectively 
aware of the risk in question and whether a given discount would tend to promote the goals of 
deterrence or punishment (should those goal be considered relevant). These facts and factors 
are merely meant, it is stressed, to illustrate considerations that might be incorporated within 
the apportionment legislation to lend some structure to the discretion that it affords judges.  
 
(b)  Fixed Reduction Rules? 
 
Amending the apportionment legislation so that the discretion that it affords judges is more 
structured would be a very modest reform. It would merely nudge the law in the direction of 
fixed apportionment. Were it adopted, judges would retain very significant freedom to 
determine the amount by which damages should be reduced for contributory negligence, and 
provided that they touch upon factors that are relevant to the case at hand, their decisions 
would be effectively insulated from appellate interference. So, while implementing this 
proposed changed might improve the present situation, the improvement would be slight. The 
system would remain an essentially discretionary one lacking appellate oversight. Therefore, 
the problems with discretionary apportionment that have been canvassed would not really be 
addressed. There are any number of other changes that could be made to the apportionment 
legislation that would result in the law travelling much farther down to the road to fixed 
apportionment. This is clear from the great diversity of fixed apportionment rules that were 
discussed earlier.120 The type of fixed apportionment rule that minimises the input from the 
judiciary to the greatest extent are rules that provide for fixed reductions in damages,121 such 
as the Froom rules. While the Froom rules leave judges with discretion as to whether to apply 
the Froom rules,122 once a judge has decided that the Froom rules apply, he has no discretion 
as to the discount to apply. Because rules that provide for fixed reductions in damages reduce 
judicial discretion by a much greater amount than the other types of fixed apportionment 
rules, they are prima facie superior to the other types of fixed apportionment rules,123 at least 
if the arguments in favour of fixed apportionment that have been set out above are 
compelling. Thus, the proposal that is being made is that the law on apportionment would be 
brought into a more satisfactory state were more fixed reduction rules created.  
 
(c)  When would it be Justifiable to Introduce Fixed Reduction Rules? 
 
Of course, there are limits to the circumstances in which introducing fixed reduction rules 
would be justified. In order for a fixed reduction rule to be justified, it would seem that at 
least four conditions would need to be satisfied. These conditions are as follows: (1) the rule 
must apply to a group of cases in which there is little relevant factual diversity; (2) cases that 
fall within the specified group would need to occur sufficiently frequently to make adopting 
the rule in question worthwhile; (3) it must be possible to define a given category of case 
reasonably clearly; and (4) as with the Froom rules, judges should be permitted to depart 
from the fixed reduction rule in exceptional circumstances. A few words need to be said 
about each of these conditions. Condition (1) refers to the need to isolate sets of cases that are 
relatively homogenous in terms of the facts that are thought to be relevant to the issue of 
apportionment. Lord Denning MR isolated such a set of cases – seat belt cases – in Froom. 
                                                          
120  See Section 4.  
121  See Section 4(a).  
122  See the text accompanying nn 49–55. 
123  See Section 4(f).  
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Generally speaking, most seat belt cases present no issues relevant to the apportionment of 
damages except those of whether the claimant failed to use a seat belt and whether that failure 
made a difference in terms of the damage suffered. It would not make sense for one seeking 
to establish more fixed apportionment rules to define a set of cases that drags within its net 
cases that vary wildly in terms of their salient characteristics. For example, an inappropriate 
category of case to which to apply a fixed reduction rule would be a category in which the 
claimant was guilty of contributory negligence in failing to follow the defendant’s 
instructions. There would be little homogeneity to such a category. Cases that fall within it 
might be thought to require very different treatment depending on, for example, how 
persistently or brazenly the claimant had failed to follow instructions, the clarity of the 
instructions and the force with which the need to comply to them was impressed upon the 
claimant, whether the defendant was a professional who was advising the claimant, and the 
vulnerability of the claimant. What is meant by condition (2), and its importance, is self-
evident. There is no utility in developing a fixed reduction rule for a group of cases if cases 
fall within that group only once in a blue moon. The significance of condition (3) is also 
axiomatic. If a given category is not defined with sufficient precision, frequent arguments 
will inevitably break out as to whether a given case falls within it. This will undermine the 
goal of promoting certainty, which is one of the reasons that has been offered for introducing 
fixed reduction rules.124 Condition (4) recognises the limitations of human foresight. No 
matter how carefully a given category of case to which a fixed reduction rule is to be applied 
is defined, there are bound to be cases which are thought to be sufficiently different from 
most of the other cases that fall within the category such that they warrant separate treatment. 
Hence, it would be desirable for judges to enjoy an exclusionary discretion, as they do in the 
case of the Froom rules,125 so that atypical cases can be insulated from the fixed reduction 
rule. Such a discretion should be exercised sparingly or else the purpose of creating the fixed 
reduction rule would be defeated.  
 
(d) To Which Categories of Case should Fixed Reduction Rules be Applied?  
 
One question that the foregoing discussion presents is what categories of case should be 
isolated and subjected to fixed reduction rules, bearing in mind the constraints mentioned 
under the previous heading? To an extent, it is possible to leave this question to one side for 
present purposes on the ground that it is subsidiary one. It should first be decided whether the 
proposal that has been advanced, namely, that more fixed reduction rules should be 
welcomed into tort law, is one that should be adopted in principle before categories of case to 
which such rules should apply are identified. However, simply by way of suggestion, some 
possible categories of case to which fixed reduction rules might sensibly be applied include 
cases in which the claimant drove while voluntarily intoxicated or travelled with an driver 
whom he knew or ought to have known was intoxicated, crossed a road without looking for 
incoming traffic, failed to use a designated and conveniently available pedestrian crossing, 
and failed to wear protective clothing. These are, it is emphasised, merely suggestions of 
categories of cases that might be relevant. The idea is to put them forward merely so that it 
can be debated whether they ought to be governed by a fixed reduction rule.  
 
(e) What Discount should be Applied?  
 
What discounts should be yielded by any fixed reduction rules that are introduced? This is an 
easier question to answer than might initially appear to be. Recall that the decision to reduce 
                                                          
124  See the text accompanying nn 108–109. 
125 See the text accompanying nn 49–55. 
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damages by a particular amount for contributory negligence is an arbitrary one.126 A decision 
to reduce damages by, for example, 25%, in cases in which the claimant accepts a ride from 
an intoxicated driver is neither more nor less justifiable than a decision to reduce damages in 
such a case by 10% or 50%. Accordingly, subject to what follows, any discount that is 
selected is neither more nor less justifiably than any other discount. Nevertheless, there are a 
few considerations that should guide the decision-making process. First, it would not make 
sense to settle upon very small discounts, such as 1%, or very large discounts, such as 99%. 
A rule that prescribed such discounts would, as Glanville Williams pointed out, be a 
‘needless technicality’.127 The claim might as well be allowed to succeed in full or be denied 
altogether. Secondly, there should be some proportionality between the various discounts laid 
down by fixed reduction rules. It would not be just, for example, to reduce damages by just 
10% for driving while intoxicated and to reduce damages by 90% for accepting a lift from an 
intoxicated driver. Thirdly, minute differences between different discounts should be 
tolerated. It would be artificial to select, for instance, a discount of 40% for one act of 
contributory negligence and 41% for another act. Such differences suggest that the selection 
of the discount is a mathematical exercise, which it is not. This explains, incidentally, why 
judges tend to reduce damages for contributory negligence in a fairly large increments. 
Discounts are usually in multiples of 10 or 5 rather than smaller units. These three 
considerations which it is suggested should be borne in mind in determining the quantum of 
discounts imposed by fixed reduction rules are not, of course, intended to be exhaustive.  
 
(f) Should Fixed Reduction Rules be Introduced by the Courts or the Legislature? 
 
Finally, should more fixed reduction rules be introduced by legislation or by the courts? The 
answer to this question is straightforward. For the reasons given earlier,128 the apportionment 
legislation in all of the major common law jurisdictions is committed to an extreme 
discretionary system of apportionment. Rules that limit the discretion that is conferred by the 
legislation are therefore inconsistent with it129 and judges are not free, therefore, to lay down 
fixed apportionment rules. It is for this reason that Froom, as argued above, was decided per 
incuriam.130 Surprisingly, Froom does not seem to have been challenged on this ground.131 
However, it is obviously inappropriate for the courts to disregard legislation. Any fixed 
reduction rules that are introduced should be introduced by statute, and the Froom rules 
should be put on a statutory footing.132   
                                                          
126  See Section 7(a).  
127  Williams (n 4) 393. 
128  See Section 3.  
129  See Section 5.  
130  See Section 6(b).  
131  It have been attacked on other bases: see the text accompanying nn 43–44. 
132  It has been suggested to me that it would be undesirable for the changes to be made legislatively given the 
experience in this connection in relation to Australia. This is not the place to delve into the Australia 
provisions (many of which have been discussed above) in detail. It suffices to say for present purposes that 
the Australian provisions were not carefully thought out, and for the sake of entertaining this suggestion, let 
this be assumed. One difficulty with this suggestion is that there is no reason to think that just because 
legislatures in one country proceeded without due care that legislatures generally should not be trusted to 
enacted fixed reduction rules. More fundamentally, this suggestion cannot get around the fact that because 
the system of discretionary apportionment is established by statute, any changes that are made to that system 




9. Objections to the Reform Recommendations 
 
It was recommended in the previous section that the law on the apportionment of damages for 
contributory negligence would be improved by retreating from discretionary apportionment 
and moving in the direction of fixed apportionment, specifically, by embracing more fixed 
reduction rules. This section considers some objections that might be raised against this 
prescription. One objection that might be made is that if more fixed apportionment rules were 
introduced, at least if they were statutory in nature (which it has been argued they should 
be133), they would undermine the independence of the judiciary. This objection is frequently 
raised against removing judges’ discretion in the context of sentencing. However, this 
complaint (which is very different from a complaint that it would be undesirable to restrict 
judges’ discretion) is unjustified, in both the sentencing context and the present setting.134 
Parliament very frequently lays down rules that leave relatively little scope for judicial 
discretion, in tort law and beyond, and this does nothing to offend the independence of the 
judiciary. The principle of judicial independence demands that Parliament should not exert 
inappropriate control over the judiciary, such as by removing judges whose decisions are 
politically unpopular from office or reducing their remuneration. Fixed apportionment rules 
obviously do not raise that spectre.  
 Secondly, it might be argued that the advantages of fixed apportionment rules could to 
some extent be obtained other than by adopting fixed apportionment rules. For example, one 
way in the way in which the law on apportionment of damages for contributory negligence 
could be rendered more certain and consistent in its application without departing from the 
paradigm of discretionary apportionment would be to make more decisions on apportionment 
publically available. As explained above,135 the way in which judges apportion damages is 
extremely opaque because there is no convenient way to access decisions of courts that sit 
lower in the judicial hierarchy than the High Court in the case of England and Wales (and 
courts in other jurisdictions similarly situated in the judicial hierarchy). A second way in 
which greater certainty and consistency could be brought to this area of the law other than by 
embracing fixed apportionment rules is by publishing guidelines similar to, for example, the 
guidelines issued by the Judicial College in relation to the award of general damages in 
personal injury cases.136 It is certainly true that implementing these alternatives would clearly 
go some way towards improving the present situation. However, in order for this objection to 
hit home, it would be necessary to establish (1) that these alternatives (individually or in 
combination) would yield a more satisfactory state of affairs than embracing more fixed 
apportionment rules and; (2) that embracing fixed apportionment rules in addition to these 
alternatives would bring no or only a marginal additional net gain. This would be a tall order. 
 Thirdly, it might be objected that the analysis complains about inconsistency (or a threat of 
inconsistency) in apportionment cases but without adducing any evidence of inconsistency. It 
is true that this article has not demonstrated that there are statistically significant differences 
in the way in which similar cases are treated in so far as apportionment for contributory 
negligence is concerned. However, several points should be kept in mind in this regard. First, 
it is not the purpose of this article to ascertain whether such differences exist. The main goals 
                                                          
133  See the text accompanying 129–131. 
134  See Ashworth (n 102) 50–54. 
135  See Section 7(b).  
136  Judicial College, Guidelines for the Assessment of General Damages in Personal Injury Cases (11th ed, 
Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2012). These guidelines are used as the starting point by the courts in 
assessing general damages in personal injury cases. Their value, in bringing certainty and consistency to 
assessments, and the consequent desirability of paying close attention to them, has frequently been stressed 
by the courts: see, e.g., ….  
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of this article are to introduce the concepts of fixed apportionment and discretionary 
apportionment, to examine the extent to which the major common law jurisdictions have 
embraced these concepts, and to consider the arguments based in theory for and against 
discretionary apportionment and fixed apportionment. Secondly, the objection would not 
answer the point that the current system presents an unacceptable risk that apportionment 
cases will be decided inconsistently. Even if there is no inconsistency, the lack of 
transparency in relation to decisions regarding apportionment in the County Courts (and 
equivalent courts in other jurisdictions) coupled with the lack of appellate oversight presents 
a serious risk that inconsistency will creep into this area of the law even if it does not already 
exist. Thirdly, inconsistency (or the risk of inconsistency) is only one of several grounds that 
have been offered for limiting judicial discretion in apportionment cases. So even if this 
consideration is thought to be unconvincing that would not show that the other arguments are 
unpersuasive.  
 
10. Wider Implications: the Law of Contribution 
 
What implications does the analysis in this article have for the law of torts generally? One 
part of tort law that needs to be kept in mind in this regard is the law of contribution. In most 
common law jurisdictions, legislation has modified the common law rule that where one 
concurrent tortfeasor satisfies the claimant’s judgment in full he cannot recover contribution 
or obtain an indemnity from any other tortfeasor.137 Leaving aside the details, which are 
unimportant for present purposes, the legislation permits a wrongdoer to recover contribution 
from any other person who is liable for the same damage. The quantum of contribution is to 
be ‘such as may be found by the court to be just and equitable having regard to the extent of 
[the] responsibility [of the person from whom contribution is sought] for the damage in 
question.’138 This language, which confers judges with significant discretion, bears a striking 
similarity to that used in many apportionment statutes. It is not surprising, therefore, that the 
Froom rules have been applied in cases in which a negligent motorist sought contribution 
from a parent who negligently failed to secure their infant child with an approved child safety 
restraint.139 This article has not addressed contribution. However, because the rules that 
govern the apportionment of damages for contributory negligence and contribution are so 
similar, the argument that has been offered in relation to contributory negligence would seem 
to apply also to contribution. The goal, therefore, if the analysis that has been offered in 
relation to contributory negligence is correct, should be to develop rules that limit judicial 
discretion in the contribution context too. Exactly how this might be achieved is something 




The main argument advanced in this article is that the apportionment legislation is slanted 
much too far in the direction of discretionary apportionment. The law regarding contributory 
negligence would be considerably improved if more fixed apportionment rules were 
introduced. Because the apportionment legislation is fundamentally committed to an extreme 
system of discretionary apportionment, it follows that the landmark case of Froom was 
decided per incuriam in so far as that decision created (or, it might be better to say, sought to 
                                                          
137  See, e.g., Civil Liability (Contribution) Act 1978. The fons et origo of the common law rule is Merryweather 
v Nixan (1799) 8 TR 186; 101 ER 1337. 
138  Civil Liability (Contribution) Act 1978, s 2(1).  
139  Jones v Wilkins [2001] RTR 19, [13]–[14] (CA) (parent liable for 25% of the damages); Hughes v Williams 
[2013] EWCA Civ 455; [2013] PIQR P17 (same). 
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create) fixed apportionment rules. However, on the analysis that has been presented here, 
Lord Denning MR, although he acted in defiance of the apportionment legislation, was right 
to be attracted to a more fixed system of apportionment.  
